An authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol is extremely essential to secure communications over insecure public networks. It enables the communication parties to securely set up a shared session key in present of the malicious attackers. Certificate-based cryptography (CBC) is a novel public-key cryptographic primitive that has many attractive merits. It solves the certificate revocation problem in conventional public-key cryptography and the key-escrow problem in identity-based cryptography. Until now, four AKA protocols have been proposed in the setting of CBC. However, all of them adopt the costly bilinear pairings and are not suitable for the devices which have limited computing resources and battery power. Therefore, it is interesting and worthwhile to design a certificate-based AKA protocol without using the bilinear pairings. In this paper, we develop a pairing-free certificate-based AKA protocol. The proposed protocol is proven secure under the classic computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Compared with the previous pairing-based certificate-based AKA protocols, the proposed protocol enjoys obvious advantage in the computation efficiency.
Introduction
To provide secure communications over insecure public networks, privacy and confidentiality should be guaranteed. An authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol enables the communication parties to authenticate each other and securely set up a shared session key for their communications over an unreliable communication channel. Therefore, it can assure the privacy and data confidentiality of the later communications.
The famous Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol [8] is the first practical key agreement protocol. However, Diffie-Hellman protocol suffers from the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack due to the reason that it does not provide authentication to the protocol participants. The protocols that can provide the authentication mechanism have attracted great attention from the research commnity (e.g. [14] [15] [16] [17] ). Over the years, many AKA protocols have been proposed. However, most of the previous AKA protocols were constructed over either conventional public-key cryptography (PKC) [4, 11, 13, 20, 25] or identity-based cryptography (IBC) [5-7, 36, 41, 44] . It is wellknown that conventional PKC suffers from the heavy certificate management problem while IBC has the key escrow and key distribution problems.
To solve the key escrow problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] presented the concept of certificateless AKA (CL-AKA) protocol by extending AKA protocol into certificateless PKC. In a CL-AKA protocol, a partially trusted key generation center (KGC) is employed to assist every user to produce a private key from a secret value selected by the user. In this way, KGC does not know any user's private key. As a result, CL-AKA protocols avoid the key escrow problem while reserving the certificateless property. Since the introduction of CL-AKA protocol, many CL-AKA protocols have been proposed [12, 19, 26, 40, 42, 47, 48] . However, KGC has to distribute a partial private key to every user over secure channels. This feature limits the application of CL-AKA protocols in the untrusted network environments, because setting up a secure channel in those environments is usually expensive.
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [10] put forward a new public-key cryptographic paradigm called certificate-based cryptography (CBC). This new cryptography lies between conventional PKC and IBC. When using CBC, every user should produce a pair of private key and public key independently and then apply for a certificate from a trusted certification authority (CA). The certificate is sent to its owner and serves as a partial decryption key or a partial signing key. This functionality of the certificate supplies an implicit certificate property so that a user can execute some cryptographic operations (e.g., decryption and signing) correctly only when both his certificate and private key are known, while this user's communication parties need not obtain the current status of his certificate. Therefore, CBC solves the certificate revocation problem in conventional PKC. Furthermore, CBC eliminates both the key escrow problem (as CA has no knowledge of users' private keys) and the key distribution problem (as CA can send the certificates to their owners publicly). Since its invention, CBC has obsorbed great interest from the cryptography community and numerous CBC schemes have been published, including certificate-based encryption (e.g. [9, 28, 31, 32, 39, 46] ), certificate-based signature (e.g. [2, 18, 21, 22, 27, 30] ) and certificate-based signcryption (e.g. [23, 29, 34] ).
To overcome the problems imposed on the previous AKA protocols, Wang and Cao [45] proposed the notion of certificate-based AKA (CB-AKA) protocol following the idea of CBC. Compared with previous types of AKA protocol, CB-AKA protocol enjoys many attractive merits. Table 1 summarizes the properties of the different types of AKA protocol, including conventional AKA protocol over conventional PKC, Table 1 Properties of AKA protocols over different public-key cryptography.
identity-based AKA (IB-AKA) protocol over IBC, CL-AKA protocol and CB-AKA protocol.
To our knowledge, there exist four CB-AKA protocols [24, 33, 35, 45] in the literature so far. In [45] , Wang and Cao proposed the first CB-AKA protocol that is based on Gentry's certificate-based encryption scheme [10] and Smart's AKA protocol [41] . Unfortunately, Lim et al. [24] point out that Wang-Cao's CB-AKA protocol is insecure against ephemeral secret leakage. To fix the weakness in Wang-Cao's protocol, Lim et al. [24] proposed an improved CB-AKA protocol. They claim that the improved protocol is secure against all non-trivial secret leakages. However, no formal security proof is given in [24] . In [35] , Luo et al. provide a security model for constructing provably secure CB-AKA protocols. They also present a CB-AKA protocol that can be proven secure in the random oracle model [3] . Recently, Lu et al. [33] pointed out that the CB-AKA protocols in [24, 35, 45] can not resist the public key replacement (PKR) attack. To fight against PKR attack, Lu et al. [33] designed a new CB-AKA protocol with provable security in the random oracle model. The motivation of this paper is to design a CB-AKA protocol without costly bilinear pairing. In practice, the cryptographic operations are often performed on some devices which have very constrained resources, such as smart phone or PDA. Due to the limited computation or the constrained battery power, only the lightweight or power-saving cryptographic schemes can be emplyed on these devices. All the previous CB-AKA protocols [24, 33, 35, 45] are constructed with bilinear pairings. Compared with other common cryptographic operations such as scalar multiplications in the elliptic curve group, the bilinear pairing may be the most expensive one. Our experiment results show that the average computation cost of a bilinear pairing is about nine times as much as that of a scalar multiplication in elliptic curve group under the 1024-bit RSA security level. Since the computationally-heavy pairing operations will greatly aggravate the computation load of a device, they are extremely disliked by the computation-limited or power-constrained devices. Therefore, as far as the efficiency, the cryptographic schemes without bilinear pairing would be more attractive.
Inspired by Schnorr's signature scheme [37] , we develop a practical CB-AKA protocol without bilinear pairing. Under the classic complexity assumption computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, the proposed protocol is proven secure in the random oracle model. Without costly bilinear pairing operations, the proposed CB-AKA protocol significantly decreases the computation cost. Compared with the previous pairing-based CB-AKA protocols [24, 33, 35, 45] , it enjoys obvious advantage in the computational efficiency and is more suitable for the power-constrained and computation-limited devices.
Preliminaries

Computational assumption
The security of our CB-AKA protocol is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Definition 1. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q. The CDH problem over G is, given a tuple (P, xP, yP) ∈ G 3 for unknown values x, y ∈ * q Z , to compute xyP. The CDH assumption holds if for any polynomial-time algorithm A, the advantage Adv(A) = Pr{A(G, q, P, xP, yP) = xyP} is negligible.
Bilinear pairing
Assume that G and G T are two cyclic groups of prime order q. A bilinear pairing e: G × G → G T is a map that satisfies the following properties:
1 Bilinearity: e(xU, yV) = e(U, V) xy for all U, V ∈ G and x, y ∈ * q Z .
2 Non-degeneracy: There exists U, V ∈ G such that e(U, V) ≠ 1.
3 Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ( , ) e U V for all , U V G ∈ .
Note that the construction of our CB-AKA protocol does not depend on the bilinear pairing. We only use this notion in the security proofs.
3. Formal model of CB-AKA protocol
Definition of CB-AKA protocol
Usually, a CB-AKA protocol consists of four algorithms: (1) System setup algorithm Setup, which is performed by a CA to produce a master secret key and a set of system public parameters; (2) User key generation algorithm UserKeyGen, which is performed by each user to produce a private key and a partial public key; (3) Certificate generation algorithm CertGen, which is performed by a CA to produce a full public key and a certificate for each user; (4) Key agreement algorithm KeyAgreement, which is performed by two communication users (an initiator and a responder) to generate a session key. Figure 1 gives a more concrete functional description of a CB-AKA protocol.
Security model of CB-AKA protocol
As introduced in [33, 35] , a CB-AKA protocol should satisfy some commonly desired security properties, including known-key security, unknown key-share resilience, basic impersonation attacks resilience, forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation resilience and key control security.
To capture these security properties, Luo et al. presented a formal security model for CB-AKA protocols in [35] . However, Lu et al. [33] There are two types of adversaries against the secu- Figure 1 Functional description of a CB-AKA protocol rity of CB-AKA protocols. ∏ always establish the same session key in the presence of a benign adversary, and the session key is distributed uniformly at random in the session key space; (2) Adv(  ) is negligible for any adversary  .
The proposed CB-AKA protocol
The proposed CB-AKA protocol is described as follows:
Setup(k):
On input a security parameter k, this algorithm generates a cyclic group G of prime order q with generator P. It then chooses a random integer * q s Z ∈ as the CA's master secret key msk and calculates the master public key P pub = sP. Furthermore, it chooses two cryptographic hash functions
k . Finally, it outputs msk = s and params = {k, q, G, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 }.
UserKeyGen(params):
On input params, this algorithm chooses a random integer
x Z ∈ as a private key U SK for a user U with identity U ID and then computes a partial public key
CertGen(params, msk, A calculates
where
( )
where 
, , , )
For the correctness of the proposed protocol, we can deduce that
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Figure 2
Key agreement phase of the proposed CB-AKA protocol At the beginning of the game, the algorithm  chooses at random pub P G ∈ as the system master public key and sends params = {k, q, G , P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 } to  1 . Furthermore, it picks three different indices I, J ∈ {1, 2,…, q cu } and T ∈ {1, 2,…, n s } at random.
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In Phase 1 and Phase 2, the algorithm  answers the adversary  1 's queries as below: PK ,
ID ,
and checks whether the following equations hold given a proper bilinear map e for the group G: 
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T . If it does,  checks whether the following equations hold:
T . If it does,  checks whether the following equations hold: 
, (14) where (4) ,
Else if 
∏ is a responder, then there exists a tuple <
H ID PK P T SK V t T + -- For both cases, we have that = Z uvP . Therefore, the algorithm  can return Z as the solution to the given CDH problem.
To derive the algorithm  's advantage in solving the CDH problem, we define the following events: (1) s Z ∈ as the master key msk and computes pub P sP = . It then outputs the public parameters params = {k, q, G, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 } and the master secret key msk = s to  2 . Furthermore, it selects three different indices I, J ∈ {1, 2,…, q cu } and T ∈ {1, 2,…, n s } at random.
In Phase 1 and Phase 2, the algorithm  answers the adversary  2 's queries as below: PK , 
h > to the list L 2 and returns i h . (3) , 
Comparison and experimental results
In this section, the computation cost comparison of our protocol and the previous pairing-based CB-AKA protocols [24, 33, 35, 45 ] is offered.
As described in Table 2 , we consider five main cryptographic operations in the comparison: bilinear pairing, exponentiation in the group G T , scalar multiplication in the group G, map-to-point hash and general hash. The computation costs of the compared protocols are listed in Table 3 .
To provide a clearer comparison, we implement all the compared protocols by using the multiprecision integer and rational arithmetic cryptographic library (MIRACAL) [38] . The experimental platform is a laptop running Windows XP with 3GHz Intel PIV CPU and 512-MB memory. For the pairing-based CB-AKA ptotocols in [24, 33, 35, 45] , we use the Tate   Table 2 Cryptographic operations in the comparison pairing defined over the supersingular elliptic curve E(F p ): y 2 = x 3 + x with embedding degree 2 where p is a 512-bits Solinas prime, which achieves the 1024-bits RSA equivalent security. Our CB-AKA protocol is impletemented over the elliptic curve E(F p ): y 2 = x 3 + ax + b, where a and b are two elements such that ∆ = 4a 3 + 27b 2 ≠ 0 in the finite field F p . To achieve the same 1024-bits RSA security level, we use the security parameter secp160r1 recommended by the Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group [43] , where p = 2 160 -2 31 -1, a = FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 7FFFFFFC and b = 1C97BEFC 54BD7A8B 65ACF89F 81D4D4AD C565FA45. We run each protocol ten times and calculate the average running time required for each protocol par- [45] . The comparison shows that our protocol outperforms the previous pairing-based CB-AKA protocols in the computation efficiency. Therefore, it is more suitable for the computation-limited devices.
Conclusion
In this paper, a practical CB-AKA protocol without bilinear pairing is proposed. The proposed protocol is proven secure under the classic CDH assumption in the random oracle model. Due to avoiding the pairing operations, it significantly reduces the computation cost. Compared with the previous pairing-based CB-AKA protocols, it enjoys obvious advantage in the computation performance.
